Event Title

How do small countries negotiate in a multipolar world? Formal models of small countries’ negotiations under international supervision

Session

Security Studies

Description

In the contemporary international stage dominated by one global hegemon and multiple regional powers, it almost never happens for smaller countries to negotiate international disputes without any international supervisions. And yet, there is a scarcity of formal models capturing such kind of negotiations. We build to formal models that try to describe dispute negotiations, one between two countries under the supervision of one neutral international actor, and the other between two countries under the supervision of two international actors, each of them siding with one of the disputing parties. Then test the models with simulated data and find equilibrium points. Finally, we face those findings with evaluated equilibriums from Kosovo-Serbia negotiations (Model 1) and Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations (Model 2). Findings would be important both to fill a theoretical gap in the existing literature and to practically inform decision makers of outcome possibilities under certain conditions.

Proceedings Editor

Edmond Hajrizi

ISBN

978-9951-550-47-5

Location

UBT Kampus, Lipjan

Start Date

30-10-2021 12:00 AM

End Date

30-10-2021 12:00 AM

DOI

10.33107/ubt-ic.2021.140

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS
 
Oct 30th, 12:00 AM Oct 30th, 12:00 AM

How do small countries negotiate in a multipolar world? Formal models of small countries’ negotiations under international supervision

UBT Kampus, Lipjan

In the contemporary international stage dominated by one global hegemon and multiple regional powers, it almost never happens for smaller countries to negotiate international disputes without any international supervisions. And yet, there is a scarcity of formal models capturing such kind of negotiations. We build to formal models that try to describe dispute negotiations, one between two countries under the supervision of one neutral international actor, and the other between two countries under the supervision of two international actors, each of them siding with one of the disputing parties. Then test the models with simulated data and find equilibrium points. Finally, we face those findings with evaluated equilibriums from Kosovo-Serbia negotiations (Model 1) and Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations (Model 2). Findings would be important both to fill a theoretical gap in the existing literature and to practically inform decision makers of outcome possibilities under certain conditions.