How do small countries negotiate in a multipolar world? Formal models of small countries’ negotiations under international supervision
Session
Security Studies
Description
In the contemporary international stage dominated by one global hegemon and multiple regional powers, it almost never happens for smaller countries to negotiate international disputes without any international supervisions. And yet, there is a scarcity of formal models capturing such kind of negotiations. We build to formal models that try to describe dispute negotiations, one between two countries under the supervision of one neutral international actor, and the other between two countries under the supervision of two international actors, each of them siding with one of the disputing parties. Then test the models with simulated data and find equilibrium points. Finally, we face those findings with evaluated equilibriums from Kosovo-Serbia negotiations (Model 1) and Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations (Model 2). Findings would be important both to fill a theoretical gap in the existing literature and to practically inform decision makers of outcome possibilities under certain conditions.
Proceedings Editor
Edmond Hajrizi
ISBN
978-9951-550-47-5
Location
UBT Kampus, Lipjan
Start Date
30-10-2021 12:00 AM
End Date
30-10-2021 12:00 AM
DOI
10.33107/ubt-ic.2021.140
Recommended Citation
Xhaja, Eglantina Kalluçi; Marleku, Alfred; and Peshkopia, Ridvan, "How do small countries negotiate in a multipolar world? Formal models of small countries’ negotiations under international supervision" (2021). UBT International Conference. 70.
https://knowledgecenter.ubt-uni.net/conference/2021UBTIC/all-events/70
How do small countries negotiate in a multipolar world? Formal models of small countries’ negotiations under international supervision
UBT Kampus, Lipjan
In the contemporary international stage dominated by one global hegemon and multiple regional powers, it almost never happens for smaller countries to negotiate international disputes without any international supervisions. And yet, there is a scarcity of formal models capturing such kind of negotiations. We build to formal models that try to describe dispute negotiations, one between two countries under the supervision of one neutral international actor, and the other between two countries under the supervision of two international actors, each of them siding with one of the disputing parties. Then test the models with simulated data and find equilibrium points. Finally, we face those findings with evaluated equilibriums from Kosovo-Serbia negotiations (Model 1) and Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations (Model 2). Findings would be important both to fill a theoretical gap in the existing literature and to practically inform decision makers of outcome possibilities under certain conditions.