Visual Communication as a tool in conducting military and hybrid operations
Session
Political Sciences and Security
Description
The analysis presents the factors, impact and threats of Russian hybrid attacks as part of building nonviolent social campaigns (in ex. in NATO's eastern flank countries) in terms os peace and war. The focus was on visual communication and digital activism in the media space, with particular emphasis on new media and social media (mostly Russian and Belarusian activism. This type of digital activism uses various tools, from cyberattacks, cyber criminality, stealing data, to legal ones such as online campaigns, fake news, hate speech, trolling, or using graphic forms such as cartoons and memes to ridicule and discredit the opponent. This part of the hybrid warfare is carried out using all internet channels, social media and platforms. Starting from sponsored articles, favorable and often paid media in the EU, manipulated videos (such as those presenting Ukrainian soldiers in an unfavorable light) to fake comments on social media, manipulated and altered photographs, mocking cartoons or memes which, as a popular means of entertainment and communication in society, create in their own way a view of reality among users. Manipulated content in the form of videos and articles most often appears on Telegram, Viber and X platform channels, which allows them to efficiently bypass EU sanctions, thus allowing users to easily access such content without the need to install a VPN. Memes and cartoons are already appearing in all social media, and while they can be treated as free artistic creation, they are also an element of well-paid campaigns. In Poland, for example, there are companies that provide services of creating marketing and political campaigns through memes. Russia is a step further, using subliminal action to give the impression that the majority of society thinks in one way or another. These include antiUkrainian campaigns conducted with particular intensity in Poland and Slovakia, anti-immigration campaigns conducted throughout Europe (led by France and Poland), alleged promotion of "traditional values” aimed at slandering life in Western Europe and negating progress. Pro-Russian campaigns in Latvia and Estonia. A detailed analysis of the campaigns mentioned will be discussed later in the article. It is worth noting that in this way Russia is building a kind of resistance movement in European societies - a mass of people who uncritically absorb information found on the Internet, a mass that is critical and even aggressive towards the rest of society, and which itself acts as a transmitter because it replicates and shares content it finds. This is an easy ground for creating and building a network of collaborators, potential collaborators, especially among the marginalized or somehow socially excluded. The tactics of individual campaigns, the possibilities of prevention, and solutions that build resilience will be discussed in detail in the paper.
Proceedings Editor
Edmond Hajrizi
ISBN
978-9951-982-15-3
Location
UBT Kampus, Lipjan
Start Date
25-10-2024 9:00 AM
End Date
27-10-2024 6:00 PM
DOI
10.33107/ubt-ic.2024.99
Recommended Citation
Ertanowska, Delfina, "Visual Communication as a tool in conducting military and hybrid operations" (2024). UBT International Conference. 14.
https://knowledgecenter.ubt-uni.net/conference/2024UBTIC/PS/14
Visual Communication as a tool in conducting military and hybrid operations
UBT Kampus, Lipjan
The analysis presents the factors, impact and threats of Russian hybrid attacks as part of building nonviolent social campaigns (in ex. in NATO's eastern flank countries) in terms os peace and war. The focus was on visual communication and digital activism in the media space, with particular emphasis on new media and social media (mostly Russian and Belarusian activism. This type of digital activism uses various tools, from cyberattacks, cyber criminality, stealing data, to legal ones such as online campaigns, fake news, hate speech, trolling, or using graphic forms such as cartoons and memes to ridicule and discredit the opponent. This part of the hybrid warfare is carried out using all internet channels, social media and platforms. Starting from sponsored articles, favorable and often paid media in the EU, manipulated videos (such as those presenting Ukrainian soldiers in an unfavorable light) to fake comments on social media, manipulated and altered photographs, mocking cartoons or memes which, as a popular means of entertainment and communication in society, create in their own way a view of reality among users. Manipulated content in the form of videos and articles most often appears on Telegram, Viber and X platform channels, which allows them to efficiently bypass EU sanctions, thus allowing users to easily access such content without the need to install a VPN. Memes and cartoons are already appearing in all social media, and while they can be treated as free artistic creation, they are also an element of well-paid campaigns. In Poland, for example, there are companies that provide services of creating marketing and political campaigns through memes. Russia is a step further, using subliminal action to give the impression that the majority of society thinks in one way or another. These include antiUkrainian campaigns conducted with particular intensity in Poland and Slovakia, anti-immigration campaigns conducted throughout Europe (led by France and Poland), alleged promotion of "traditional values” aimed at slandering life in Western Europe and negating progress. Pro-Russian campaigns in Latvia and Estonia. A detailed analysis of the campaigns mentioned will be discussed later in the article. It is worth noting that in this way Russia is building a kind of resistance movement in European societies - a mass of people who uncritically absorb information found on the Internet, a mass that is critical and even aggressive towards the rest of society, and which itself acts as a transmitter because it replicates and shares content it finds. This is an easy ground for creating and building a network of collaborators, potential collaborators, especially among the marginalized or somehow socially excluded. The tactics of individual campaigns, the possibilities of prevention, and solutions that build resilience will be discussed in detail in the paper.