Gomato_ICSSC2025 - Two-Speed Peripheries: Kosovo, Georgia, and the Toxic Legacy of Bucharest 2008

Session

Security Studies

Description

This study examines how the divergent outcomes of Kosovo and Georgia reveal the structural flaws of the post–Cold War European security order. It explores how the quality of deterrence—credible in Kosovo and ambiguous in Georgia—shaped statehood trajectories, regional stability, and the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The research adopts a comparative qualitative approach grounded in deterrence theory and the geopolitics of frozen conflicts. It draws on historical case studies, official NATO and UN documents, and secondary academic sources to analyse how the presence or absence of credible deterrence influenced post-conflict consolidation. Findings indicate that tangible military deterrence, embodied by NATO’s enduring KFOR presence, secured Kosovo’s stability, while declaratory deterrence and delayed commitments left Georgia exposed to Russian intervention. The 2008 Bucharest Summit institutionalised this asymmetry, embedding structural ambiguity into EuroAtlantic policy and weakening deterrence credibility. The study concludes that Western ambiguity has functioned as an accelerant of conflict rather than a restraint. It argues that credible, visible, and enforceable deterrence remains essential to prevent further destabilisation along Europe’s periphery and to preserve the legitimacy of the Euro-Atlantic order.

Keywords:

Kosovo, Georgia, NATO, Russia, European Security, Bucharest 2008

Proceedings Editor

Edmond Hajrizi

ISBN

978-9951-982-41-2

Location

UBT Lipjan, Kosovo

Start Date

25-10-2025 9:00 AM

End Date

26-10-2025 6:00 PM

DOI

10.33107/ubt-ic.2025.296

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS
 
Oct 25th, 9:00 AM Oct 26th, 6:00 PM

Gomato_ICSSC2025 - Two-Speed Peripheries: Kosovo, Georgia, and the Toxic Legacy of Bucharest 2008

UBT Lipjan, Kosovo

This study examines how the divergent outcomes of Kosovo and Georgia reveal the structural flaws of the post–Cold War European security order. It explores how the quality of deterrence—credible in Kosovo and ambiguous in Georgia—shaped statehood trajectories, regional stability, and the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The research adopts a comparative qualitative approach grounded in deterrence theory and the geopolitics of frozen conflicts. It draws on historical case studies, official NATO and UN documents, and secondary academic sources to analyse how the presence or absence of credible deterrence influenced post-conflict consolidation. Findings indicate that tangible military deterrence, embodied by NATO’s enduring KFOR presence, secured Kosovo’s stability, while declaratory deterrence and delayed commitments left Georgia exposed to Russian intervention. The 2008 Bucharest Summit institutionalised this asymmetry, embedding structural ambiguity into EuroAtlantic policy and weakening deterrence credibility. The study concludes that Western ambiguity has functioned as an accelerant of conflict rather than a restraint. It argues that credible, visible, and enforceable deterrence remains essential to prevent further destabilisation along Europe’s periphery and to preserve the legitimacy of the Euro-Atlantic order.