Deterrence without detonation: The strategic use of nuclear rhetoric in the Ukraine war
Session
Security Studies
Description
This paper examines the strategic use of nuclear rhetoric by Russia during the war in Ukraine and its impact on conventional warfare dynamics and Western strategic decisionmaking. Rather than relying on the actual use of nuclear weapons, Russian officials have employed veiled threats and ambiguous declarations as tools of psychological deterrence and geopolitical signaling. By analyzing key instances of rhetorical escalation and their timing in relation to Western arms deliveries and military support for Ukraine, the study reveals how nuclear signaling has influenced the pace and scope of external involvement in the conflict. We use qualitative event tracing and focused content analysis, labeling key nuclear statements (2022–2025) and comparing them with major Western decisions on support, the timing of shipments, and official public statements. The findings underscore a shift in deterrence practices, where language and perception operate as instruments of coercion. This evolving form of rhetorical brinkmanship carries broader implications for deterrence theory, nuclear norms and the future of crisis management in a multipolar world.
Keywords:
deterrence, nuclear rhetoric, Russia, Ukraine, threats
Proceedings Editor
Edmond Hajrizi
ISBN
978-9951-982-41-2
Location
UBT Lipjan, Kosovo
Start Date
25-10-2025 9:00 AM
End Date
26-10-2025 6:00 PM
DOI
10.33107/ubt-ic.2025.297
Recommended Citation
Marleku, Alfred; Xhixha, Hajdi; and Selimi, Dea, "Deterrence without detonation: The strategic use of nuclear rhetoric in the Ukraine war" (2025). UBT International Conference. 4.
https://knowledgecenter.ubt-uni.net/conference/2025UBTIC/SS/4
Deterrence without detonation: The strategic use of nuclear rhetoric in the Ukraine war
UBT Lipjan, Kosovo
This paper examines the strategic use of nuclear rhetoric by Russia during the war in Ukraine and its impact on conventional warfare dynamics and Western strategic decisionmaking. Rather than relying on the actual use of nuclear weapons, Russian officials have employed veiled threats and ambiguous declarations as tools of psychological deterrence and geopolitical signaling. By analyzing key instances of rhetorical escalation and their timing in relation to Western arms deliveries and military support for Ukraine, the study reveals how nuclear signaling has influenced the pace and scope of external involvement in the conflict. We use qualitative event tracing and focused content analysis, labeling key nuclear statements (2022–2025) and comparing them with major Western decisions on support, the timing of shipments, and official public statements. The findings underscore a shift in deterrence practices, where language and perception operate as instruments of coercion. This evolving form of rhetorical brinkmanship carries broader implications for deterrence theory, nuclear norms and the future of crisis management in a multipolar world.