The Correlates of Global Trumpism: A Study of Three Geopolitical Swing States in Europe
Session
Political Science
Description
Observers frequently link Donald Trump’s rise in U.S. politics to a global wave of populism that includes everything from the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote to the election of far-right leaders in Brazil. Some even write about a “global Trumpism” by which Trump himself becomes a symbol in public opinion beyond U.S. borders. The extent and sources of foreign support for Trump, however, remain open questions and have yet to be subjected to systematic public opinion research. We open up this research agenda through original, nationally representative surveys conducted in 2018 in two countries representing very different post-Cold-War geopolitical orientations: the traditionally “pro-American” Albania and the more “anti-American” (and pro-Russian) Serbia. Focusing on variation in the degree to which respondents view Donald Trump as treating their own country more favorably than have other recent U.S. presidents, we find that support for Trump abroad is indeed linked to many of the same dispositions that have been found to win him support at home, including a belief in strongman leadership, personal appeal, intolerance of Muslim refugees, skepticism of NATO, and pro-Russian sentiment. While these patterns generally hold across country context, baseline Trump favorability is confirmed to be far higher among the traditionally more “pro-Russian” Serbs in Serbia than among the traditionally more “pro-American” Albanians in Albania. Global Trumpism is not, however, found to be channeling discontent with one’s own country’s politicians as in the US. It is also not consistently reflecting economic dissatisfaction: While Trump appeals to people with low income, the less-educated, and individuals who consider themselves to be economic losers in the post-communist transition, he loses support among people whose own material situation has deteriorated over the previous year. Global Trumpism, then, appears to be rooted more strongly in the cross-context appeals of cultural conservatism, leadership style, and geopolitical orientation than in dissatisfaction with economic trends or one’s own country’s politics.
Keywords:
Global Trumpism, foreign support for Trump, belief in strongman leadership, intolerance of Muslim refugees, skepticism of NATO, pro-Russian sentiment
Session Chair
Labinot Greiçevci
Proceedings Editor
Edmond Hajrizi
ISBN
978-9951-550-19-2
Location
Pristina, Kosovo
Start Date
26-10-2019 12:30 PM
End Date
26-10-2019 1:00 PM
DOI
10.33107/ubt-ic.2019.106
Recommended Citation
Hale, Henry and Peshkopia, Ridvan, "The Correlates of Global Trumpism: A Study of Three Geopolitical Swing States in Europe" (2019). UBT International Conference. 106.
https://knowledgecenter.ubt-uni.net/conference/2019/events/106
The Correlates of Global Trumpism: A Study of Three Geopolitical Swing States in Europe
Pristina, Kosovo
Observers frequently link Donald Trump’s rise in U.S. politics to a global wave of populism that includes everything from the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote to the election of far-right leaders in Brazil. Some even write about a “global Trumpism” by which Trump himself becomes a symbol in public opinion beyond U.S. borders. The extent and sources of foreign support for Trump, however, remain open questions and have yet to be subjected to systematic public opinion research. We open up this research agenda through original, nationally representative surveys conducted in 2018 in two countries representing very different post-Cold-War geopolitical orientations: the traditionally “pro-American” Albania and the more “anti-American” (and pro-Russian) Serbia. Focusing on variation in the degree to which respondents view Donald Trump as treating their own country more favorably than have other recent U.S. presidents, we find that support for Trump abroad is indeed linked to many of the same dispositions that have been found to win him support at home, including a belief in strongman leadership, personal appeal, intolerance of Muslim refugees, skepticism of NATO, and pro-Russian sentiment. While these patterns generally hold across country context, baseline Trump favorability is confirmed to be far higher among the traditionally more “pro-Russian” Serbs in Serbia than among the traditionally more “pro-American” Albanians in Albania. Global Trumpism is not, however, found to be channeling discontent with one’s own country’s politicians as in the US. It is also not consistently reflecting economic dissatisfaction: While Trump appeals to people with low income, the less-educated, and individuals who consider themselves to be economic losers in the post-communist transition, he loses support among people whose own material situation has deteriorated over the previous year. Global Trumpism, then, appears to be rooted more strongly in the cross-context appeals of cultural conservatism, leadership style, and geopolitical orientation than in dissatisfaction with economic trends or one’s own country’s politics.