The procedure of impeachment of the president in Kosovo and Albania: A Comparative Constitutional Approach

Session

Law

Description

In government systems where branches and powers are separated and balanced (check and balance), impeachment is an instrument of the Parliament for blaming (accusing) the head of state. Initiation of the guilt procedure for violation of the Constitution by the president is rarely put into practice. However, this happens due to the fact that the systems are built in such a way that the guilt procedure initiated by the legislator must necessarily be verified or rejected by the Constitutional Court. This made the presidents stable and influential political actors of the constitutional system. The impeachment procedure against the president is a constitutional process with political effects. The paper deals with the constitutional procedures of raising the impeachment against the president. The approach of dealing with this problem is comparative and constitutional. The research includes the interpretation of constitutional provisions and special cases of the Constitutional Court of guilt as against the president in Kosovo and Albania. The methodology used in this paper is the mixed method and the method of comparative analysis. Case studies common elements and differences between them. The findings from the research reflect the different specifics of the procedures for raising the responsibility of the president in Kosovo and Albania and the procedure for dismissing the president from office in the two countries. In Albania, the president's mandate ends immediately after the verdict of the constitutional court as violation of the Constitution, while in Kosovo, apart from the verdict of the Constitutional Court for violation of the constitution, the Assembly can dismiss the president with two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of all deputies.

Keywords:

Impeachment, violation of the Constitution, Serious crime, Dismissal of the President, Parliament

Proceedings Editor

Edmond Hajrizi

ISBN

978-9951-982-15-3

Location

UBT Lipjan, Kosovo

Start Date

25-10-2024 9:00 AM

End Date

27-10-2024 6:00 PM

DOI

10.33107/ubt-ic.2024.70

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Oct 25th, 9:00 AM Oct 27th, 6:00 PM

The procedure of impeachment of the president in Kosovo and Albania: A Comparative Constitutional Approach

UBT Lipjan, Kosovo

In government systems where branches and powers are separated and balanced (check and balance), impeachment is an instrument of the Parliament for blaming (accusing) the head of state. Initiation of the guilt procedure for violation of the Constitution by the president is rarely put into practice. However, this happens due to the fact that the systems are built in such a way that the guilt procedure initiated by the legislator must necessarily be verified or rejected by the Constitutional Court. This made the presidents stable and influential political actors of the constitutional system. The impeachment procedure against the president is a constitutional process with political effects. The paper deals with the constitutional procedures of raising the impeachment against the president. The approach of dealing with this problem is comparative and constitutional. The research includes the interpretation of constitutional provisions and special cases of the Constitutional Court of guilt as against the president in Kosovo and Albania. The methodology used in this paper is the mixed method and the method of comparative analysis. Case studies common elements and differences between them. The findings from the research reflect the different specifics of the procedures for raising the responsibility of the president in Kosovo and Albania and the procedure for dismissing the president from office in the two countries. In Albania, the president's mandate ends immediately after the verdict of the constitutional court as violation of the Constitution, while in Kosovo, apart from the verdict of the Constitutional Court for violation of the constitution, the Assembly can dismiss the president with two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of all deputies.